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Designing Catastrophe Bonds 
to Securitize Systemic 
Risks in Agriculture: 
The Case of Georgia Cotton 
Dmitry V. Vedenov, James E. Epperson, 
and Barry J. Barnett 
This article makes an initial attempt to design catastrophe (CAT)  bond products for 
agriculture and examines the potential of  these instruments as mechanisms for 
transferring agricultural risks from insurance companies  to investors/speculators in 
the global capital market. The case of  Georgia cotton is considered as a specific 
example. The CAT bond contracts are based on percentage deviations of  realized 
state average yields relative to the long-run average. The contracts are priced using 
historical state-level cotton yield data. The principal finding of the study is that the 
proposed CAT bonds demonstrate potential as risk transfer mechanisms for crop 
insurance companies. 
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Introduction 
Agricultural production is susceptible to the influence of  various hazards. Farmers' 
unique and substantial exposure to natural disasters caused by factors such as adverse 
weather and disease has led to the development of  various agricultural insurance 
products (Kramer, 1983). For crop production in the United States, insurance policies 
are  available primarily through the federal crop insurance program. These policies cover 
most causes of crop loss and are sold by private insurance companies. The federal govern- 
ment provides premium subsidies for farmers as well as administrative and operating 
(A&O)  cost reimbursement and subsidized reinsurance for insurance companies partici- 
pating in delivery of crop insurance policies (Glauber and Collins, 2002; Glauber, 2004). 
Federal reinsurance, which is of main interest in the context of this article, is provided 
through the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA)  between the Federal Crop Insur- 
ance Corporation and participating companies (Glauber, 2004; Vedenov et al., 2004). 
The current study analyzes the potential of catastrophe (CAT) bonds as an alternative 
reinsurance tool for private insurance companies underwriting crop insurance. 
The original motivation for federal reinsurance of  crop insurance policies was the 
perceived inability of private insurance markets to absorb broad risk exposures over 
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large geographic areas (Kramer, 1983; Glauber and Collins, 2002). This is due to the 
systemic (spatially correlated) nature of risks inherent in agricultural production, and 
thus the potential for losses of catastrophic magnitude (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). 
However, the  establishment of the  public-private crop insurance delivery system in 1980 
led to additional subsidies being built into federal reinsurance provisions in order to 
provide incentives for private insurance companies to participate in the program 
(Glauber, 2004; Barnett, 2003). The SRA allows insurance companies to allocate their 
insurance portfolios among reinsurance funds with different levels of risk reduction. The 
funds are structured so that the companies both reduce risk exposure and increase 
expected return.' Such a system obviously differs from traditional market-based rein- 
surance contracts which typically provide risk reduction in exchange for a decrease in 
expected net return. The presence of  heavily subsidized federal reinsurance greatly 
reduces market incentives for private reinsurance of crop insurance. 
In recent years, a series of  innovative financial instruments such as catastrophe 
options and catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds) have been introduced to hedge against 
catastrophe risks such as widespread losses due to hurricanes and/or earthquakes in 
heavily populated areas (Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000; George, 1999; Froot, 1999; 
Hommel, 2000).  Unlike traditional insurance contracts,  these instruments  transfer risks 
rather than pool them. This feature  makes them attractive to insurance companies faced 
with a high systemic component of  insurance portfolio risk that cannot be diversified 
away. 
In particular, CAT bonds provide a mechanism that insurance or reinsurance com- 
panies can use to transfer nondiversifiable risks (e.g., due to natural disasters) to capital 
markets (Lewis and Davis, 1998;  Jaffee and Russell, 1997).  CAT bonds are  usually sold 
to both private and public investors who are interested in adding to their portfolios 
instruments with returns that are uncorrelated with traditional financial instruments 
such as stocks and bonds. CAT bonds are similar in design to conventional bonds in that 
they are a loan given to the issuing firm by investors who, in return, expect payment of 
interest and repayment of principal at  the end of an agreed period (Cummins, Lalonde, 
and Phillips, 2000). CAT bond investors, however, agree to forfeit the interest and/or 
principal under certain well-defined conditions such as  an occurrence of a catastrophic 
event. The issuer may then utilize the proceeds from selling the bonds to offset losses 
caused by the event. 
CAT bonds have been issued by insurance and reinsurance companies since 1996. In 
recent years, the uses of  CAT bonds have begun to extend beyond protection against 
natural  perils, encompassing, thus far,  risk coverage against power failures, cancellation 
of sporting events, epidemics, and acts of terrorism (Bowers, 2004; Lee, 2004). Despite 
growing interest in CAT bonds in other areas of insurance, they have never been used 
to hedge disaster risks in agriculture. Nonetheless, based on their use in other sectors 
of the economy, it seems logical that CAT bonds could play a similar role in agriculture. 
The ability of CAT bonds to transfer the systemic component of risk to capital markets 
may provide the reinsurance capacity to absorb widespread losses from crop insurance, 
the very lack of which was the original motivation for federal provision of reinsurance. 
Analysis of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement and its effect on crop insurance is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Interested readers may refer to Glauber and Collins (2002);  Glauber (2004);  Mason, Hayes, and Lence (2003);  and Vedenov 
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Private crop insurance companies could potentially use CAT bonds to shift at  least part 
of their catastrophic agricultural risk exposure to capital markets. If so, policy makers 
could reconsider the motivation, nature, and extent of  federal reinsurance, and thus 
perhaps reduce taxpayer exposure to reinsurance losses on crop insurance policies. 
To the best of  our knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt to design CAT 
bonds for transferring the systemic risk present in agricultural crop production. The 
results obtained for the case study of Georgia cotton demonstrate the potential for CAT 
bonds as a reinsurance mechanism for crop insurance companies. 
The specific  objectives of this study are  (a)  to introduce the concept of CAT bonds with 
a particular focus on hedging systemic risks in crop production, (b)  to describe CAT bond 
designs and pricing mechanisms that could be used in agriculture, and (c) to examine 
the potential efficiency of CAT bonds as reinsurance vehicles for insurance companies 
underwriting crop insurance using the case of Georgia cotton as an empirical example. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows. The next section provides further 
background information on CAT bonds. This is followed by a section that: (a)  discusses 
the basic structure of  a CAT bond contract, (b) describes the particular characteristics 
of the  specific  CAT bonds considered in this research, (c)  presents a pricing methodology, 
and (d)  describes procedures for analyzing the effectiveness of CAT bonds as hedging 
instruments. The results of the empirical analysis are then presented. The final section 
offers concluding comments and discussion of the potential role of CAT bonds as  reinsur- 
ance mechanisms for crop insurance. 
CAT Bonds 
CAT bonds belong to a family of index-based instruments because the occurrence of the 
catastrophic event is usually determined based on realizations of a prespecified stochastic 
variable or index2  More specifically, a CAT bond purchaser typically agrees to forfeit a 
portion or all of the expected financial payments from the bond in the event the index 
exceeds a prespecified threshold. 
CAT bonds were introduced in the mid-1990s in the wake of enormous losses caused 
by hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the  Northridge earthquake in 1994 (Lewis and Davis, 
1998). One of the largest ($477 million) issues was placed by United Service Automobile 
Association  (USAA) in 1997 (Lewis and Davis, 1998; Froot,  1999). The issue was 
oversubscribed and generated considerable trading in secondary markets. Overall, five 
CAT bond issues were placed in 1997, involving $633 million in risk capital to hedge 
potential losses from natural perils such as hurricanes and earthquakes. The bonds 
were sold offshore to select groups of  investors at premiums in some cases surpassing 
a 5% spread over LIBOR3  (Banks, 2004; Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000; Bossom et al., 
2004). The relatively high spreads over LIBOR encompassed both the risk premium on 
'Other agricultural  applications  of index-based instruments include area yield insurance (Skees,  Black,  and Barnett, 1997; 
Baquet and Skees, 1994) and weather derivatives (Turvey,  2001; Martin, Barnett, and Coble, 2001; Vedenov and Barnett, 
2004; Skees et al., 2001).  At a sufficient level of abstraction,  all of these instruments can be treated as  contingent claims that 
trigger based on realizations of the underlying stochastic index. 
LIBOR stands for "London interbank offer raten  and represents a rate at which large banks  are willing to accept deposits 
for a specified period of time. This rate is widely used to approximate a risk-free  rate and is considered by financial institu- 
tions as the opportunity cost of capital (Hull, 2004, pp. 93-94). A rate of return on any financial instrument can be then 
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comparably rated corporate bonds and a novelty premium. The latter reportedly compen- 
sates for ambiguity about the probability of catastrophic events that rarely occur in a 
given location, loss aversion which leads to subjective overvaluing of loss probabilities, 
and the cost of the  learning curve for a complex new market (Banks, 2004; Bantwal and 
Kunreuther, 2000; Daneshvaran and Morden, 2004; Nell and Richter, 2004).  Aside from 
higher rates of return, CAT bonds are attractive to investors because returns on the 
bonds are not correlated with that of the market portfolio (Banks, 2004). 
Although still rather small compared to the corporate bond market, the CAT bond 
market has continued to grow since its inception. Nine issues involving $1.22 billion in 
risk capital were placed in 2002, and 15  issues involving $1.73 billion were placed in 
2003 (Bossom et al., 2004; Bowers, 2004). While CAT bonds are not intended to replace 
reinsurance completely, they have been providing reinsurance capacity for a layer of 
low-probabilityhigh-loss risk exposure. The amount of capital involved in these trans- 
actions indicates the presence of demand for these types of se~urities.~  Admittedly, the 
rates of return required by investors in CAT bonds still remain relatively high compared 
to conventional reinsurance. However, the risk capital under management via CAT 
bonds is expected to continue trending upward as  the cost of issuing CAT bonds declines 
with the establishment of more standardized bond structures and as the investor base 
expands and becomes more knowledgeable (Bowers, 2004). While not currently used in 
agriculture, CAT bonds could similarly provide alternative (or additional) means of 
reinsuring catastrophic layers of crop insurance loss risks. 
Empirical Approach 
Basic Structure of a CAT Bond Contract 
Before discussing applications of CAT bonds to agriculture, it is instructive to consider 
the basic structure and terminology of a CAT bond contract. CAT bonds are typically 
issued by insurance companies for a predetermined period of time, e.g., one year, with 
a specific face value. As with traditional bonds, the company essentially borrows a certain 
amount (principal or face value) from investors and repays the principal plus a specified 
amount of interest at  maturity. Unlike traditional bonds, however, the  issuing company 
reserves the right to forfeit payment of  interest and part or all of  the principal if a 
specified triggering event occurs. The latter can be defined in a variety of ways, but 
usually reflects a situation in which the company experiences catastrophic losses. For 
example, the triggering event may be a category three or higher hurricane in a given 
geographic area during the bond lifetime, or a case of total insured losses of the issuing 
company exceeding a certain threshold. 
Alternatively, the CAT bond can be structured as a zero-coupon bond that is initially 
sold at  a discount. An investor's return is then the difference between the purchase price 
and the face value. The issuing company again reserves the right to forfeit payment of 
part or all of  the face value if a predetermined triggering event occurs. The analysis 
presented in this paper considers such zero-coupon CAT bonds. 
Note that the presence of well-developed secondary markets for CAT  bonds, while beneficial for price discovery, is not 
required in order to use CAT  bonds' risk-reducing capability. As long as  the issuing entity can place the issue on the primary 
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More formally, assume a zero-coupon CAT bond is issued at  time 0 with the  face value 
F and time to maturity T. The payoff VT  of the bond at  maturity is conditional on reali- 
zation of a certain index L relative to the predetermined trigger value D so that: 
A x F  if L > D  (bond is triggered), 
VT = (  F  if L _< D  (otherwise), 
where 0 2 A < 1  is the proportion of the face value repaid to investors. In other words, 
part or all of the proceeds from selling the bond are retained by the issuing company 
when the index L exceeds the specified trigger D; otherwise, the bond pays its face 
value, which includes the initial amount borrowed and a return on the investment. 
For example, suppose an insurance company ABC issued a CAT bond with the face 
value of F  = $1,000 and maturity T of one year, and sold it  at  discount for $920. The pay- 
off of  the CAT bond is conditional on total insured losses of  the company (L) over one 
year not exceeding a preset limit of D = $5 million. 
If the total insured losses of ABC over one year were only L = $3 million, i.e., below 
the trigger level of $5 million (L <Dl,  then an  investor who purchased the bond for $920 
would receive the face value of $1,000 one year later (VT  = F  = $1,000), and thus realize 
a return of  ($1,000 - $920)/$920 = 8.7%. The latter can also be interpreted as a 5.5% 
spread over a one-year LIBOR rate of 3.2%.5  However, if the total insured losses of ABC 
over the  one-year period were $6 million (L >Dl,  the company would only repay a preset 
proportionA of the  bond's face value. For example, ifA = 0.5, the investors would receive 
only 50% of the face value of each CAT bond at  maturity (i.e., VT  =A  x F  = $5001, while 
the company would keep the remaining $420 from the initial proceeds and use it to 
offset 10sses.~  Similarly, ifA = 0.25, the investors would receive $250 and the company 
would keep the remaining $670. In the extreme case ofA = 0, the company would keep 
all the proceeds from selling the bond and the investors would receive nothing at 
maturity. 
Note that the  CAT bond structure described above can offer flexible  bond designs with 
differing triggers, rates of return, and proportions of face value repaid in case of a cata- 
strophic event. However, all of these parameters need to be fixed in order to specify a 
particular bond contract. 
The Proposed CAT Bond Contracts 
In the absence of a traded underlying asset, insurance-linked securities have been struc- 
tured to pay conditional on three types ofvariables-insurance  industry catastrophe loss 
indices, insurer-specific catastrophe  losses, and parametric indices based on the physical 
characteristics of catastrophic events. For example, Property Claim Services (PCS), an 
insurance industry statistical agency, defines catastrophes as losses from catastrophic 
perils that cause insured property damage of $5 million or more (Cummins, Lewis, and 
Phillips, 1998). In agriculture, however, farmers deal with natural perils on an  annual 
basis, and crop insurance is provided based on cropping season cycles. Therefore, it is 
This is the LIBOR rate as of January 1,2005. 
Note that the issuing company may invest the initial proceeds from selling the bond in risk-free securities, e.g.,  Treasury 
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hard to define agricultural catastrophes in terms of  insured losses based on the PCS 
definition. 
A different way of defining catastrophes in agriculture is presented in this study. For 
a given crop, it is assumed the state average yield loss (i.e., the percentage deviation of 
realized state average yield from its long-term average) for each year adequately repre- 
sents insured losses suffered by insurance companies writing crop insurance policies in 
the state. Note that the choice of a triggering variable involves a tradeoff between moral 
hazard and basis risk (Doherty, 1997).  In order to eliminate or minimize the prospects 
for moral hazard, a trigger related to state-level yield loss is appropriate because yield 
loss values depend only upon realized state average yield. Thus, there is no incentive 
for insurers to over-report losses in an attempt to increase recoveries. In addition, 
realized yield incorporates a cumulative representation of  losses due to catastrophes, 
no matter what kinds of  catastrophic events or how many of  them occur during the 
growing season. In this regard, different yield loss thresholds could be used to define 
different levels of catastrophes and thus alternative triggers for CAT bonds. 
The hypothetical CAT bond analyzed in this study is crop- and location-specific,  with 
cotton as a representative crop and Georgia as the location. A specific location is neces- 
sary because different areas have different exposures to risk factors affecting crop 
production. Cotton was chosen for the analysis because of its importance in Georgia and 
its high ranking in liability among all crops insured through crop insurance programs 
administered by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).  It is assumed that a 
hypothetical crop insurance company ABC is the issuer of the CAT bond. 
The purpose of  the CAT bond is to provide protection from catastrophic losses in a 
given year. The proposed instruments are zero-coupon CAT bonds sold at  discount. The 
selling price of  the bonds determines the rate of return, which can be interpreted as a 
certain percentage spread over the LIBOR. Design aspects of the agricultural CAT bond 
contract in this study include the following: 
The CAT bond contracts are sold annually with a maturity of one year, and provide 
disaster coverage for insured losses on cotton suffered by insurance company ABC 
over the course of a year due to all causes. 
The payoff structure of  the CAT bonds is given by equation (1).  The index deter- 
mining the payoff of the bond is the realized yield loss measured as a percentage 
deviation of  realized state average yield y from the long-term average state yield 
y : 
L  =  maxI0,y -Y) 
3 
The trigger levels D are set as specified percentages of yield losses. 
The payout schedule of the CAT bond contract as a function of the percentage loss 
of  state average yield is fixed when the contract is issued. In particular, the CAT 
bond contract stipulates the face value F of  the bond as well as its proportion A 
repaid to the investor in case of default. Without loss of generality, the face value 
of  all CAT bond contracts in this study is set to one dollar. 
Expected yield losses are derived from a probability distribution of  state yields, 
which in turn is estimated from historical data on state average yields. 324  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
By design, if the realized state average yield does not deviate from the long-term 
average by more than the  preset trigger percentage, the  CAT bonds repay the  face value 
at  maturity. Otherwise, the CAT bonds default, paying either nothing or only a part of 
the face value to the investor depending on the design. For example, if the long-term 
average state  yield is 500 lbs./acre and the trigger is set at  40%, then realized state aver- 
age yields below 300 lbs./acre would trigger the CAT bonds, while realized state  average 
yields above 300 lbs./acre would not affect the bond payoff. 
Pricing Methodology of CAT Bonds 
In this analysis, CAT bond prices are based on the discounted expected payoff of the 
bond over possible states  of nature. Such an approach assumes that  the  triggering index 
underlying CAT bond contracts is characterized by a stationary distribution. Given the 
nature of the index used in our analysis, this appears to be an appropriate assumption 
as stationarity of aggregate yields around a deterministic trend is commonly accepted 
and documented in the agricultural economics literature (Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Ker 
and Goodwin, 2000; Ker and Coble, 2003; Mason, Hayes, and Lence, 2003; Schintkey, 
Sherrick, and Irwin, 2003; Sherrick et al., 2004). 
Alternative valuation approaches are based on an assumption that the underlying 
index variable follows a stochastic process (e.g., option valuation models). Such models 
are widely used in finance literature for contracts which can be bought and sold at any 
point in time so that prices change on a nearly continuous basis. However, these are  not 
applicable to our analysis since the CAT bonds are sold by the issuing company only 
once, and mature after a fixed period of time. Further, the value of the underlying 
index (state average yield) is also realized only once during the life of the contract (at 
harvest17 
The suggested approach to pricing a CAT bond involves two basic steps: (a)  estimating 
the distribution of the index underlying the CAT bond contract and thus probabilities 
of  triggering the bond, and (b)  incorporating the estimated probabilities and the 
required rate of  return into the bond contract price (Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips, 
1998; Baryshnikov, Mayo, and Taylor, 1998; Lee and Yu, 2002). 
A nonparametric technique-kernel  density estimation-was  used to derive the distri- 
bution of the index from historical yield data. Kernel density estimation was preferred 
to parametric estimation because it better preserves the information contained in the 
data, which could be missed by imposing a parametric structure. 
Kernel density estimation constructs the  probability distribution of a random variable 
x as a sum of specially selected functions or kernels of the form: 
where f  (x) is  the kernel density function; x, ,  .  .  .  ,  xn are observations (realizations) of the 
random variablex;  H  is a smoothing parameter called bandwidth; and K(u)  is  the kernel 
One can conceivably develop a continuous valuation model for the suggested CAT bonds based on changes in yield 
predictions over the growing season. Such a model could be used as a pricing tool for CAT bonds traded in the secondary 
market. However,  this would be of little interest to the issuing company that receives only the proceeds from bond placement 
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(Wand and Jones, 1995).  The Epanechnikov kernel, which is one of the standard kernel 
functions, was used to model the distribution of percentage deviations of state average 
yield from its long-term average.' The functional form for the kernel is written as: 
%(I - u2)  Iu(  < 1, 
otherwise. 
A CAT bond is valued by taking the discounted expectation of its possible payoffs 
under the derived distribution of realized yield losses (the triggering variable) and the 
required rate of return on investment. The formula for pricing a CAT bond with time to 
maturity T is then given as: 
V = E,,,  [VT  ~xP(-JOT  dt)  dt)  ] 
where VT is the payoff of a CAT bond in (11, r(t)  is the appropriate interest rate used to 
discount future cash flows, and E,,,  indicates expectations with respect to two state 
variables. It  is reasonable to assume that the state  variable 8,  which for the purpose of 
valuing catastrophe bonds essentially encompasses the term structure of interest rates, 
is independent of the state variable 11, which pertains to catastrophe risk per se. Under 
this assumption, the CAT bond price becomes: 
V = E,VT  x E, exp  -  r(t)  dt  ,  [LT  1 
where now E,VT is the expected payoff of the CAT bond, and 
is the expected value of a conventional zero-coupon bond. 
Note that  the  pricingformula (5)  essentially separates  the  risk of default due to occur- 
rence of a catastrophic event from the risk of default due to all other factors. Models of 
default risk of  conventional securities are well developed in finance theory (Bluhm, 
Overbeck, and Wagner, 2003). Since the primary goal of this paper is to evaluate effici- 
ency of CAT bonds in managing catastrophic risks in agriculture, we do not explicitly 
include such a model in our study. Instead, we rely on the efficient market hypothesis 
which implies that the risk of default can be incorporated into the bond price through 
an  appropriate rate of return used to discount future cash flows. In particular, the risk 
of insurance company ABC defaulting on repayment of the  bond's face value at  maturity 
due  to factors other than a catastrophic event can be incorporated into the  pricing model 
(5)  by setting the discount rate r(t)  equal to the rate of return required by investors in 
conventional zero-coupon bonds of comparable risk (e.g., bonds with the same maturity 
issued by companies with the same bond rating as our hypothetical company ABC). 
It is relatively easy to obtain an analytical pricing formula for a conventional zero- 
coupon bond under the assumption of a constant interest rate r(t) s r. In this case, the 
The Epanechnikov kernel was chosen in particular because it has finite support. This is an important requirement in 
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solution B(0,  T)  is found by discounting the face value of the bond at the appropriate 
discount rate for the time period T, i.e., 
E, exp(-/:  rdt) = B(0, T) = exp(-rT). 
Using (11, the expected payoff of the CAT bond can be written as: 
where PrIL  Dl is the probability of  the realized yield loss less than or equal to the 
trigger level D, and Pr{L > D} is the probability of the opposite event. 
Thus, the general pricing formula for CAT bonds can be given by: 
In other words, the  price of the CAT bond can be represented as the product of the  price 
of  a conventional zero-coupon bond and the expected payoff from the CAT bond. 
The pricing model (6) assumes that the financial market is liquid and there are no 
arbitrage opportunities. The price of a specific CAT bond depends on the parameters of 
the bond (face value F,  trigger level D, and proportion A of face value repaid in case of 
a catastrophic event) as well as the selected discount rate and the probability distri- 
bution of the triggering index. The analysis presented later in the paper uses various 
combinations of these factors. 
Hedging Analysis 
All of the CAT bonds used in this analysis are priced to be actuarially fair, i.e., selling 
the  bonds does not change the expected return of the issuing company ABC regardless 
of bond face value and the number of bonds issued. Thus, the impact of  issuing CAT 
bonds on ABC's financial situation is analyzed by focusing on the resulting reduction in 
variance of net returns. Specifically,  it  is assumed that the  ABC company is risk averse 
and would prefer lower variability of returns. 
Since the  rate  of return expressed as  percentage of retained premiums is simply equal 
to one minus the loss ratio, the company's objective can be formulated as minimization 
of  the variance of  its loss ratio where the loss ratio is calculated net of  CAT  bond 
revenues and costs. Similar approaches have been used in previous studies where risk 
management tools were assumed to be actuarially fair (Miranda, 1991;  Smith, Chouinard, 
and Baquet, 1994; Barnett et al., 2005). An alternative approach may involve maxi- 
mization of expected utility. However, this criterion is not used in our analysis since it 
is more suitable for instruments that affect both the mean and variance of  returns. 
Further, the expected utility criterion requires an additional assumption about the 
utility function itself. 
To model the insurer's loss ratio and hedging strategy, let X be total losses of insur- 
ance company ABC in its crop insurance line of business before issuing CAT bonds, let 
P be total premiums of  crop insurance company ABC  in its crop insurance line of 
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of business after issuing CAT bonds, and let Y be the insurer's net gain or loss from 
selling a single CAT bond. Note that the latter depends on whether the CAT bond is 
triggered, and is determined as: 
V -A  x F,  bond is triggered, 
Y=V-v,= 
{v-F7  otherwise, 
where Vis the bond's selling price (6),  and V,  is the bond's payoff at maturity as defined 
in (1). 
Company ABC7s  loss ratio before issuing the CAT bond can be defined as: 
Assuming the insurance company ABC issues a certain number N of CAT bond contracts, 
its total losses after issuing the bonds can be determined as: 
where C is the fured cost of issuing CAT bonds. The company's loss ratio after issuing 
CAT bonds can then be expressed as: 
The optimal hedging strategy can now be derived by minimizing the variance of the 
loss ratio given by: 
X  Y  Var(LR) = Var ($1  + N 2Var  ($1  - 2NcOv  (p, , 
where Var(X1P) is the variance of  the insurer's loss ratio before issuing CAT bonds, 
Var(Y1P) is the variance of the ratio of net gain~loss  from issuing CAT bonds and the 
insurance premiums, and Cov(XIP, YIP) is the covariance between the two. Differenti- 
ating (7)  with respect to N and solving the first-order conditions results in the optimal 
number of contracts: 
Thus, in order to calculate N': it is necessary to compute the variance of the ratio of 
net gains/losses from issuing the CAT bond to the total premiums, Var(YIP), and the 
covariance between it and the loss ratio before issuing the bonds, Cov(XIP, YIP). The 
distribution of loss ratio XIP can be estimated based on historical loss ratio data. The 
distribution of  net gainsllosses Y,  and hence the variance of  the ratio YIP, can be 
estimated based on the payout structure of  the CAT bonds described in (1)  for given 
parameters of  the contract. However, this is not enough to calculate Cov(XIP, YIP) 
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on two marginal distributions alone. Instead, the  covariance must be determined empiri- 
cally based on historical data on losses and the derived distribution of  the triggering 
index. 
Data 
Since the payoff of the proposed CAT bond depends on the level of realized yield losses 
for Georgia cotton, the distribution of yield losses is necessary for correct bond pricing. 
This can be derived from historical yield data. In addition, data on premiums and 
indemnities associated with underwriting cotton insurance in the state of Georgia are 
required for evaluation of CAT bond performance in hedging catastrophic risks. 
Official yield data  were obtained from the  U.S. Department of Agriculture's National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA/NASS). The annual cotton yield data cover the 
period between 1900  and 2002. However, because of major changes in federal  commodity 
programs (Becker, 1999), only data for 1974 to 2002 were used. Insured loss data 
including dollar values of  premiums and liabilities were obtained from USDA's  Risk 
Management Agency (RMA). Although these data span the period from 1948 to 2002, 
only data from 1974 to 2002 were used to match the corresponding yield data. 
Raw yield data cannot be used when modeling distributions of yield losses because 
changes in technology generally foster higher yields over time. The commonly used 
approach in the agricultural economics literature is to assume that the yield data can 
be divided into two components: the central tendency (trend) and the deviation from 
central tendency (Goodwin and Ker, 1998;  Ker and Goodwin, 2000; Ker and Coble, 2003; 
Mason, Hayes, and Lence, 2003; Schintkey, Sherrick, and Irwin, 2003; Sherrick et al., 
2004; Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). Central tendency captures the effects of tech- 
nology change, while deviations from central tendency reflect natural risks including 
risks of catastrophic events. It is  the deviations from the central tendency that are  then 
used to estimate the kernel density function (2) of  the stationary distribution of  the 
triggering index. 
In this analysis, we follow the detrending  approach used by Skees, Black, and Barnett 
(1997)  for GRP contracts. They analyzed several detrending procedures including ARIMA 
models, robust double exponential smoothing, and spline regression, and concluded that 
piece-wise linear (spline)  detrending is a pragmatic, intuitive approach, which is robust 
across a variety of crops. 
The spline regression procedure involves fitting a series of linear regressions repre- 
senting different time segments and piecing the estimated relationships together into 
a spline function. The general form of the estimated relationship can be specified as: 
where In(  y,) is the natural logarithm of the yield observed in year t; ti, i = 1, ..., n, are 
the knots of  the spline regression (i.e., the points at which the slope of  the spline 
function changes); and 6i, i = 1, ..., n, are  dummy variables equal to 1  for all observations 
such that ti 5 t, and 0 otherwise. 
Based on equation (91, the realized percentage losses of state average yield L, can be 
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where 3, are the trends fitted in (9), and lit are the corresponding residual terms.g  The 
calculated realizations (10) of the percentage losses of  state average yield (triggering 
index) can then be used to estimate the kernel density function in (2). Specific imple- 
mentation details of both detrending and kernel density estimation procedures are 
discussed in the next section. 
Historical premium and loss data also have to be adjusted to reflect nonstochastic 
changes over time. For example, global or local climate changes may increase or decrease 
the chances of loss for the insurance company; changes in the insurance portfolio may 
affect amounts of premiums &d  associated liabilities, etc. In addition, premiums and 
losses are expressed in nominal terms and thus are affected by inflation. However, the 
ratios of  premiums to liabilities (premium rates) and indemnities to premiums (loss 
ratios) are free of these problems. Therefore, historical premium rates and loss ratios 
are  assumed to correctly represent corresponding  distributions. The historical premiums 
can then be adjusted to their 2002 equivalents based on crop insurance program liabil- 
ities (as reported by the FCIC) for Georgia cotton in that year1'  so that 
where P?  are the 2002 equivalents of total FCIC premiums from cotton in Georgia in 
year t, P,  are the actual (historical)  total FCIC premiums from cotton in Georgia in year 
t, A,,,  are total FCIC liabilities for cotton in Georgia in  year 2002, and 4  are total FCIC 
liabilities for cotton in Georgia in year t. 
Empirical Results 
Detrending and Index Density Estimation 
Estimation of  the yield trend model (9) in a general form is a rather complicated 
procedure. However, if the number and locations of knots are fxed, the model in (9) 
becomes linear and can be easily estimated by OLS. For purposes of this analysis, the 
number and locations of  knots were determined in the following way. First, we esti- 
mated all possible models with one knot and selected the best model based on an  adjusted 
R2  criterion. Two additional goodness-of-fit criteria-F-statistics  and the Akaike infor- 
mation criterion (Greene, 2003)-were  also calculated in each case and yielded model 
rankings consistent with the adjusted R2  criterion. In the same way, the best models 
were determined for two-, three-, and four-knot splines. These four best models were 
then compared. The one-knot spline model resulted in a negatively sloped trend for the 
second linear segment of  the spline (most recent years), which contradicts the 
assumption that  the trend is driven by improvements in technology. The two-knot model 
"Negative"  losses in (10)  correspond  to situations when the realized  state average yields are above long-term  average and 
are of no consequence to the CAT bond issuer. However, it is  important to preserve those observations  for correct estimation 
of the distribution function of the trigger variable presented in the next section. 
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had knots at  years 4 and 11 and resulted in a better fit than the one-knot spline. Three- 
and four-knot splines  provided no real improvement in goodness-of-fit over the  two-knot 
spline model. Both of them also had clusters of  adjacent knots (i.e., changes of  slope in 
two or more consecutive years), which was an indication of  overfitting." 
Therefore, the piece-wise linear trend with two knots was used for the subsequent 
analysis. The fitted trend function is: 
where t, = 4 and t2  = 11 are the knots of  the spline; 6,, i = 1,2, are dummy variables 
equal to 1  for ti 2 t and zero otherwise. Thep-values of estimated coefficients are given 
in parentheses. The model has an  adjusted R2  of 0.54, and all coefficients  are  significant 
at  the  95% confidence  level. Logarithms of observed and fitted yields are  shown in  figure 
1. The model tracks the data well, provides a reasonably good fit, and reflects the gen- 
eral tendency of  cotton yield in Georgia. The realized yield losses for each year were 
computed based on the estimated trend according to (10). 
After detrending the yield data, the next step was to estimate the probability density 
function (2) of the trigger index using the Epanechnikov kernel (3). This process also 
required choosing an  appropriate bandwidth H. Various methods are  available for band- 
width selection (Wand and  ones, 1995).  For this study, we used the  least-squares cross- 
validation method12  which resulted in the  bandwidth H  = 0.20882.  The estimated kernel 
density of percentage yield losses is shown in figure 2. 
Numerical integration was used to compute probabilities of triggering CAT bonds for 
given trigger values based on the estimated density function. For example, with 40%, 
35%, and 30%  triggers, the probabilities of a CAT bond being triggered are 2.2%, 3.85%, 
and 6.1%, respectively. The general tendency is that the higher the trigger level, the 
lower the probability the bond is triggered, and vice versa. 
CAT Bond Pricing 
Prices of CAT bonds were calculated using pricing formula (6) and the estimated distri- 
bution function of the  triggering index for various combinations of bond parameters. The 
specific parameter values were chosen so as to cover a reasonable range for each 
parameter. 
The index (percentage yield loss) is, by definition, confined to the range between 0% 
and 100%.  However, values greater than 50%  were not observed in the sample. There- 
fore, eight triggers were used in the analysis ranging from 15%  to 50% in increments of 
5%. Values of  parameter A are limited to the range between 0 (bond repaying 0% of 
stated face value when a triggering event occurs) and 1  (bond repaying 100% of stated 
face value when a triggering event occurs). Of course, settingA equal to, or close to, one 
l1 Note that detrending is not intended to fit the absolute best possible piece-wise linear function to the observed data. In 
the extreme, the best fit is, of course, a piece-wise linear function that simply connects the observations  by linear segments, 
i.e.,  a function with the number of knots equal to the number of observations.  Such a "trend,"  however, would result in zero 
residuals, which defies the purpose of extracting the stationary distribution from the detrended data. 
''Bandwidths  obtained using alternative selection methods  were also calculated  and used to price CAT bonds. The results 
were similar to those presented here, and therefore are not reported. Vedenov, Epperson, and Barnett  Designing Catastrophe Bonds for Agriculture  33  1 
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Figure 1. Historical yields and fitted trend for Georgia cotton 
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Figure 2. Probability density function of percentage yield losses 
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Table 1. CAT  Bond Prices for Different Bond Parameters 
Required  Trigger 
Return  A  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40%  45%  50% 
Notes:  The trigger is measured as percentage loss of state average yield for cotton. A is the proportion of the face 
value repaid to investors if the bond is triggered. F'rices are computed based on Epanechnikov kernel density 
estimation. 
defies the purpose of the CAT bond, as the company simply repays all or almost all of 
investors' money regardless of whether or not the  triggering event occurs. Therefore, the 
values of parameter A were set to 0,0.3, and 0.5, which correspond to bonds repaying 
0%, 30%,  and 50% of the stated face value, respectively, when a triggering event occurs. 
Finally, the required rates of return were set at 7.5%, lo%,  and 12.5%. For the LIBOR 
rate  of 3.2% (see  footnote 5),  this translates into risk premiums between 4.3% and 9.3%. 
While there are no natural limits on the values of  the required return, it seems this 
range of risk premiums is sufficiently representative of spreads required by investors 
in existing CAT bonds (Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Froot, 1999). 
The calculated prices of CAT bonds for various values of the parameters are summar- 
ized in table 1. Note that the total return realized by investors when the bond is not 
triggered is always higher than the required return used in computing the bond price. 
The difference between the two is an additional premium associated with the catas- 
trophic risk.13  As a consequence, for a given value of parameter A and required return, 
CAT bond prices decrease with the trigger values, since a lower trigger means that the 
bond is more easily triggered and thus is more risky.14  Similarly, other things equal, as 
the  value of parameter A increases so does the  CAT bond price. Since a larger proportion 
of the face value is repaid if the  bond triggers, the  risk of loss is lower and the  bond price 
is higher regardless of the specific trigger level. Finally, it can be seen that, other things 
equal, bond prices decrease as the required rates of  return increase and vice versa, 
which is a standard result of finance theory. 
l3 For example, an investor who purchased a bond with the required return of 7.5%,  trigger of 30%,  andA = 0 for $0.8711 
(table I), and received $1 face value one year later, would realize a total return of  13.8%  (compounded continuously). 
Assuming a LIBOR rate of  3.2%  (as of  January 1, 2005), this can be interpreted as a 3.2%  risk-free return plus a 4.3% 
premium associated with the risk of default for any reason other than a catastrophic event, and an additional 6.3%  premium 
associated with the catastrophic risk inherent in the bond. 
"  Recall that for a zero-coupon bond, a lower price means a higher return and vice versa. Vedenov,  Epperson. and Barnett  Designing Catastrophe Bonds for Agriculture  333 
Table 2. Optimal Number of CAT Bonds for Different Bond Parameters 
Required  Trigger 
Return  A  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40% 
0.5  22,703,600  24,280,980  26,287,590  26,168,690  26,930,010  0 
Notes: The trigger is measured as percentage loss of state average yield for c0tton.A is the proportion of the face 
value repaid to investors if the bond is triggered. Prices are computed based on Epanechnikov kernel density 
estimation. 
Hedging Analysis 
In order to fmd the optimal number of $1 CAT bond contracts for a specific crop, equation 
(8)  is employed. As indicated previously, the joint density of  the two variables-loss 
ratios and gains from issuing CAT bonds--cannot be derived analytically. However, the 
correlation coefficient for the  two variables can be computed empirically using historical 
data. More specifically, it is assumed that our hypothetical insurance company ABC 
issued one-year zero-coupon CAT bonds each year from 1974 to 2002. Payout informa- 
tion can then be generated based on the specified payout structure (1)  of the CAT bonds 
and yield loss information from past years. We were unable to obtain crop insurance 
premium and loss data by individual insurance company; thus, for purposes of  this 
study, ABC  is assumed to underwrite all cotton crop insurance policies in Georgia. 
Therefore, the loss ratio for ABC each year is the same as that for all cotton crop insur- 
ance policies sold in Georgia. 
The optimal number of contracts that ABC must issue to minimize the  variance of its 
loss ratio was computed for required returns of 7.5%, lo%,  and 12.5%;  values of param- 
eter A of 0,0.3, and 0.5; and trigger values ranging from 15% to 40%. The results are 
summarized in table 2. As can be seen, for a given trigger level, the optimal number of 
CAT bonds increases with the portion A of face value repaid to investors. Since higher 
values of A mean less capital retained in case of a catastrophic event, the bond issuer 
needs to issue more bonds to hedge the same amount of risk. Similarly, for a given A, 
the optimal number of  CAT bonds increases when the trigger increases from 15% to 
35%.  This is true because the  loss, and thus the number of bonds needed to compensate 
for the loss, is cumulative moving from lower to higher trigger levels. The results also 
show that beyond the 40% level, the optimal number of bonds falls to zero. The risk of 
state-average yield losses in excess of 40% is insufficient to warrant issuance of CAT 
bonds given the historical data series for cotton yield. Finally, as  required rates of return 
increase from 7.5% to 12.5%, all else equal, the optimal number of bonds decreases. 334  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Higher required returns mean that the bonds have to be sold at a deeper discount, i.e., 
they are more costly to the issuer. 
Since the objective of insurer ABC is to minimize the variance of the loss ratio, it is 
important to observe the variance reduction of the loss ratio given that the company 
issues the optimal number of CAT bonds. Different scenarios were considered with the 
parameterA equal to 0 and 0.5, trigger levels set at 15%  and 35%,  and required returns 
again set at 7.5%, lo%, and 12.5%.  The variance reduction has been calculated as the 
difference between the variance of  the loss ratio the company would have without 
issuing the CAT bonds and the variance of the loss ratio (7) with the optimal number 
of CAT bond contracts issued (expressed as a percentage of the former). Table 3 illus- 
trates the potential effectiveness of issuing CAT bonds. 
While there seems to be a slight decrease in CAT bond risk-reducing effectiveness at 
higher required returns, the differences are not meaningful. In other words, company 
Al3C can still benefit from issuing CAT bonds even if it is forced to build higher rates 
of return into the  bond price (e.g., due to lower credit risk ratings). Also, there seems to 
be no advantage to varying the proportion A of  the face value repaid if the bond is 
triggered. Therefore, Al3C can issue CAT bonds with higher values of A, thus making 
them more attractive to investors.15 However, the reduction in the variance of the loss 
ratio is shown to vary substantially across trigger levels, all else equal. The general 
trend is decreasing variance reduction, but not monotonically, as trigger level rises. 
Thus far, the optimal number of  CAT bonds for different contract parameters has 
been determined using full in-sample information. In reality, the performance of CAT 
bonds in risk reduction is measured in an out-of-sample environment. For example, 
company Al3C may determine the number of bonds to sell this year based on the data 
from previous years. Consequently, out-of-sample analysis is important to verify the 
relevance and plausibility of the in-sample results. 
In order to perform the out-of-sample analysis, we divided the full sample of  29 
observations into two subsamples of 15  and 14  observations, respectively. The years for 
each subsample were chosen randomly.16  The first subsample was then used to price the 
bonds and determine the optimal number of  contracts to issue, while the second was 
used to perform the hedging analysis. This procedure was then repeated five times and 
the results averaged. The same methodology used for pricing and hedging in  the 
in-sample analysis was employed for the out-of-sample analysis. Similarly, the values 
of bond parameters in table 3 were also used for the out-of-sample analysis. The corres- 
ponding reduction in loss ratio variance is reported in table 4. 
The out-of-sample results in table 4 are similar to the in-sample results in table 3. 
Once again, both the required return and parameterA appear to have little to no impact 
on variance reduction of the loss ratio. However, variance reduction changes substan- 
tially with the trigger level, as was the case in-sample. 
l5 The assumption here is that a bond which promises to repay at least 50%  of face value if triggered is perceived as less 
risky, and hence more attractive than a bond which repays nothing if triggered. 
l6 While it is common to divide the sample by chronological order (i.e.,  use the first rn observations  for estimation, and the 
last n for analysis), this is not the best approach for the purposes of this study. In particular,  the yield series often include 
streaks of relatively good or relatively bad years (figure 1).  If, for example, a subsample used for pricing had a high incidence 
of above-average  yields, the risk of triggering the bond would be underestimated.  At the same time, the subsample used to 
evaluate CAT bond efficiency would have a high incidence of below-average yields, and thus overestimate the risk-reducing 
capabilities of the bonds. Randomization of samples somewhat mitigates this effect and allows for more realistic analysis. Vedenov, Epperson. and Barnett  Designing Catastrophe Bonds for Agriculture  335 
Table 3. In-Sample Reduction in Variance of the Loss Ratios 
Required  Contract 
Return  (A = 0, D = 35%)  (A = 0, D = 15%)  (A = 0.5, D = 35%)  (A = 0.5, D = 15%) 
7.5%  28.5%  56.6%  26.3%  56.0% 
10.0%  27.9%  56.5%  24.7%  55.6% 
12.5%  27.2%  56.4%  23.0%  54.9% 
Notes: The trigger D is measured as percentage loss of  state average yield for cotton. A is the proportion of  the 
face value repaid to investors if the bond is triggered. 
Table 4. Out-of-Sample  Reduction in Variance of the Loss Ratios 
Required  Contract 
Return  (A = 0, D = 35%)  (A = 0, D = 15%)  (A = 0.5,  D = 35%)  (A = 0.5,  D = 15%) 
7.5%  12.8%  51.8%  13.0%  52.0% 
12.5%  13.5%  52.0%  10.9%  51.6% 
Notes: The trigger D is measured as percentage loss of state average yield for cotton. A is the proportion of the 
face value repaid to investors if the bond is triggered. 
Summary and Conclusions 
CAT bonds have been used since 1996 by insurance companies to hedge catastrophic risk 
exposure. The introduction of CAT bonds has  been driven both by the dramatic increase 
in catastrophe losses over the last decade and by insufficient capacity of conventional 
reinsurance markets for financing losses from catastrophes. However, CAT bonds have 
never been used in the field of agriculture. This research is an attempt to design a series 
of CAT bonds for cotton in Georgia using the state-level average yield as  a trigger. Differ- 
ent CAT bond contracts with different parameters were designed and priced. Hedging 
analysis  was conducted to evaluate risk-reduction capabilities of CAT bonds. While some 
details of  the design and pricing methodology relate to previous studies on index 
instruments (Skees,  Black, and Barnett, 1997)  and estimation of yield distributions (Ker 
and Goodwin, 2000; Ker and Coble, 2003), the paper contributes to the literature by 
analyzing an entirely new class of index insurance instruments for risk management in 
agriculture and evaluating their effectiveness in the context of reinsurance rather than 
primary insurance instruments." 
The instruments designed in this study are zero-coupon CAT bonds priced so as to 
provide a certain required rate of return plus an additional risk premium. The required 
rate of return, which can be interpreted as a certain spread over the LIBOR, compen- 
sates the bondholder for the time value of money and the risk of default due to reasons 
other than occurrence of a catastrophic  event. The additional premium compensates the 
bondholder for bearing the catastrophic risk. 
"  Primary insurance instruments are contracts purchased by  individual producers to hedge their crop production risk. 336  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The triggers of the CAT bond contracts are specified as certain levels of yield loss mea- 
sured as  percentage deviations of realized state  average yield from its long-term average. 
Once the realized yield loss exceeds the trigger, the CAT bonds default, paying either 
nothing or a preset proportion of the face value to the investor, depending on design. 
Computation of CAT bond prices involves estimation of the probability distribution 
of the index variable, i.e., the realized yield losses. The realized yield losses were 
calculated based on spline detrending of historical yield data. The probability density 
function was then estimated empirically using a kernel density estimator with the 
Epanechnikov kernel and an appropriate bandwidth. The procedure captures the basic 
structure  of the  yield data  and generates accurate probabilities of triggering CAT bonds. 
Findings of  the study reveal that CAT bond prices increase with the trigger and 
proportion A of  the face value paid to investors, since increases in either parameter 
reduce catastrophic risk exposure and thus associated risk premium. Hedging perform- 
ance as measured by reduction in the variance of the issuer's loss ratio is also affected 
by the parameters of the bond. The principal finding of the study is that for the case of 
Georgia cotton, CAT bonds proved to be fairly effective in hedging catastrophic risk 
exposure. In particular, when issued optimally, CAT bonds reduced the variance of the 
loss ratio of a hypothetical insurance company by as much as 56%. 
While CAT bonds performed fairly well even at lower trigger levels (i.e., in the range 
of noncatastrophic losses), it should be noted that the results of the hedging analysis 
were obtained under an assumption that a single crop insurance company underwrites 
all cotton insurance policies in the state. In reality, crop insurance policies are under- 
written by more than one company, and a single company may only serve a portion of 
the state. In such situations, CAT bonds with triggers tied to realized state-level yields 
may not be as effective in reducing variability of the total loss ratio due to basis risk. 
However, such CAT bonds should retain their risk-reducing capabilities at higher 
trigger levels-i.e.,  in the case of catastrophic events for which they are designed in the 
first place. Indeed, extremely low state-level yields are usually caused by spatially 
correlated events that  simultaneously affect many areas. In practice, a hedging analysis 
similar to the one presented in this paper can be conducted and the feasibility of  CAT 
bonds can be ascertained for individual cases given availability of necessary data. 
For the case considered, this study presents evidence that CAT bonds may be used 
to reduce an insurance company's exposure to systemic risks present in a portfolio of 
crop insurance policies, and thus may have the potential to be used as agricultural risk 
transfer  mechanisms.  The primary  application  of  CAT  bonds  can  be  seen  as a 
reinsurance mechanism for insurance companies underwriting crop insurance. 
Practical adoption of CAT bonds in agriculture would likely require changes in the 
existing federal  program that reinsures crop insurance policies. Otherwise, there is  little 
to no market incentive for participating insurance companies to seek alternative  means 
of  risk transfer. Unfortunately, direct comparison of  CAT bonds to existing federal 
reinsurance is  extremely difficult because one cannot meaningfully disentangle the  risk- 
reduction aspects of federal reinsurance from the  implicit subsidies built into the system. 
Evaluation of CAT bonds in hypothetical "what if" scenarios with reduced or eliminated 
federal reinsurance would depend critically  on the  assumptions underlying such scenarios. 
Furthermore, the  analysis would also have to account for changes in the  behavior of insur- 
ance companies in  response to changes in  federal reinsurance provisions. Such an  analysis 
goes beyond the scope of this article, but may be an area for future research. Vedenov, Epperson. and Barnett  Designing Catastrophe  Bonds for Agriculture  337 
Regardless, the findings of this analysis suggest CAT bonds may be a viable instru- 
ment for transferring systemic agricultural production risks. To the extent these findings 
can be generalized to other crops and regions (an important empirical question), they 
challenge the primary rationalization for federal reinsurance of  crop insurance 
policies-i.e.,  that private markets lack an ability to absorb the extreme systemic risks 
present in agriculture. While the current structure of  federal reinsurance provisions 
reflects a variety of public policy objectives, these findings suggest that policy makers 
could reconsider the nature and extent of federal reinsurance, and thus perhaps reduce 
taxpayer exposure to reinsurance losses on crop insurance policies. 
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